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The Contradictions of Hegemony: 
The United States and  
the Arab Spring
Nicholas Kitchen
In the United State’s response to the events of the Arab Spring, the Obama administration has been consistently careful not to get ahead of fast-moving developments. Critics have 
decried the administration’s apparent lack of a coherent approach, and its willingness 
to talk the language of democratic ideals whilst acting to protect national interests. 
Supporters, on the other hand, have praised the blending of pragmatism and principle as 
evidence of a smarter approach to international affairs than that of Obama’s predecessor. 
The United States’ cautious and contradictory approach, which has at times amounted to 
the endorsement of the inevitable, reflects wider strategic tensions in the United States’ 
approach to the Middle East, and the reality that whilst the US may be the most important 
external power in the region, its ability to dictate outcomes is limited. Yet by ‘muddling 
through’ and insisting on keeping the United States on the right side of history throughout 
the course of the Arab revolutions, the Obama administration has ensured that the new 
regimes in the region will have to continue to work with the United States, and ensured that 
the US is not diverted from its overriding strategic reorientation towards the Asia-Pacific.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN STRATEGY IN THE MIDDLE EAST
The United States’ strategic involvement in the Middle East is rooted in two sources: a hegemonic interest 
in secure and stable oil markets, and an overarching ideological commitment to the state of Israel that 
is reinforced by significant domestic pressures. The consequence of these core interests has been that 
since the early part of Cold War the United States has maintained a strategy of preventing any one 
regional or extra-regional power from gaining regional hegemony, largely by maintaining a deterrent 
force ‘over the horizon’, and on occasion intervening to uphold a regional balance. Thus in 1990, the 
United States went to war in the Persian Gulf to prevent Iraq using its occupation of Kuwait as a launching 
pad to control Saudi Arabia’s oil reserves and threaten Israel’s security. Throughout the Cold War, whilst 
becoming increasingly committed to Israel as the sole democracy in the region, the United States had 
built alliance relationships with autocracies as part of the wider cause of anti-communist containment, 
to ensure that oil supplies would not be disrupted for political ends, threatening not only the American 
economy but the system of industrial capitalism itself. Those relationships were maintained throughout 
the 1990s both to derive support for the continuing isolation of Iran and Iraq under the policy of ‘dual 
containment’, and as the price for the maintenance of peace agreements with Israel. 
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Yet if following the Cold War most of the regimes in 
the region were pro-American, their publics certainly 
were not. The United States’ commitment to stability 
and the status quo in part sustained the stagnant 
economic, political and social systems of the region and 
drove the rise of Islamism and Salafism. Having failed 
to successfully overthrow the authoritarian regimes of 
the region, from the 1990s, terrorism came to focus 
on the ‘far enemy’ that sustained them, the United 
States. Of particular concern for Osama Bin Laden and 
Al-Qaeda was the presence of ‘infidel’ American troops 
in Saudi Arabia, which hosts two of Islam’s holiest 
sites in Mecca and Medina, the United States having 
abandoned ‘over the horizon’ hegemony following the 
Gulf War in order to actively contain Iraq. Supporting 
the Saudi monarchy had become central to American 
strategy in the region, since as the world’s largest 
oil producer any disruption in Saudi supply would 
prove difficult for other producers to replace, yet this 
hegemonic interest increasingly came into conflict 
with American national security priorities, particularly 
after it emerged that fifteen of the nineteen hijackers 
that were responsible for the attacks of September 
11, 2001 were citizens of Saudi Arabia.
Indeed, following 9-11, some argued that the major 
benefit of regime change in Iraq would be that 
it would allow the United States to withdraw its 
troops from Saudi Arabia. In reality of course the 
invasion and occupation of Iraq did more to catalyse 
anti-Americanism across the region than America’s 
enforcement of Iraqi no-fly zones from Saudi soil ever 
did. Moreover, the imperatives of the ‘war on terror’ 
reinforced America’s relationships with authoritarian 
regimes, and in particular their intelligence services, 
which were simultaneously legitimated in their tactics 
– used equally against political dissenters as against 
terrorist suspects.
Yet for all the priority given to oil supplies, Israel’s 
security and the regimes that sustained American 
hegemony over the Arab world, after 9-11 the United 
States diagnosed the region’s authoritarian regimes 
as the root of the terrorist problem, and prescribed 
democracy as the solution to the Middle East’s socio-
economic woes. Launching the ‘Freedom Agenda’ 
in 2003 at the National Endowment of Democracy, 
George W. Bush renounced sixty years of ‘excusing 
and accommodating’ in the Middle East, asserting that 
‘in the long run, stability cannot be purchased at the 
expense of liberty.’ Bush emphasised that democracy 
promotion was not just a case of promoting American 
values, but was emphatically in the American national 
interest, since regimes that oppressed their populations 
created the conditions for radicalisation and terrorism.
Whilst Iraq headlined the Freedom Agenda in 
the region, there was significant development of 
institutional capacity for democratisation, and by the 
end of Bush’s presidency hundreds of millions had 
been spent on democracy promotion in the Middle 
East and North Africa. Initiatives such as the Middle 
East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and the Middle East 
Free Trade Area (MEFTA) were regional expressions 
of a clear policy shift, and caused significant concern 
among Washington’s regional allies, most notably in 
Cairo and Riyadh, who had to be reassured by senior 
administration officials that they were to be ‘partners’ 
in this policy rather than targets. 
Nonetheless, the contradictions of the Freedom 
Agenda as part of the wider ‘war on terror’ were 
clear. Did the United States seek short-term counter-
terrorism measures enacted through the security 
apparatus of allied authoritarian regimes, or was it 
prioritising the long-term emancipation of societies in 
the Middle East in an attempt to address the deeper 
roots of marginalisation and underdevelopment from 
which violent extremism grew? The administration’s 
reaction to Hamas’ victory in elections in Gaza in 
2006 highlighted the broader contradiction between 
supporting democracy and the implications for Israel 
and the United States of what the popular will of 
societies in the region expressed, and increasingly led 
democracy promotion efforts to focus on economic 
liberalisation over political reform. Officials in the State 
Department and the Pentagon were well aware that 
the United States was pursuing policies in the broader 
Middle East that were fundamentally at odds with 
one another, driven by competing bureaucracies in 
Washington and the region in the absence of genuine 
strategic coordination. Yet the tensions – long-term 
versus short-term; hegemonic interest versus specific 
security priorities; stability versus reform – were in 
some ways insurmountable.
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THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION AND  
THE ARAB SPRING
There can be no doubt that these basic contradictions 
formed the sclerotic backdrop to the United States’ 
response to the unfolding events of the Arab Spring. 
Obama had come to office determined to reverse 
what one senior official called America’s ‘Middle 
East detour over the course of the last ten years’ and 
to refocus America’s strategic priorities on the Asia 
Pacific region in which China had been allowed to 
rise unchecked. Yet the legacies of his predecessor’s 
war on terror had first to be addressed, as Obama 
attempted to rebuild America’s reputation among 
Muslims within a region that in 2008, according to the 
Pew Research Centre, had more confidence in Osama 
Bin Laden than they did in George W. Bush. Obama’s 
speech in Cairo in June 2009, in which he proclaimed 
his intention ‘to seek a new beginning between the 
United States and Muslims around the world’, did 
improve the United States’ credibility and standing, at 
least initially, and the withdrawal of American troops 
from Iraq proceeded as per the Bush administration’s 
schedule. Yet the administration’s failure to follow 
through on the hopeful rhetoric – particularly the 
failure to successfully pressurise Israel with regard 
to the Palestinian question – if anything led to a 
further deterioration in America’s standing with publics 
in the region. In Egypt, Jordan and the Palestinian 
territories, as well as in Turkey, over three-quarters 
held an unfavourable view of the United States at the 
time of the Arab Spring. Moreover, the pro-democracy 
movements haven’t themselves improved perceptions 
of the United States, with views remaining profoundly 
negative, as they have been for a decade.
If dealing with ‘legacy issues’ had at best mixed success, 
the more fundamental contradictions in American 
policy remained. Foreshadowing the Arab Spring, 
protests in Iran in June 2009 represented the first test 
for an administration committed to engagement with 
Iran in the hope of opening up diplomatic pathways 
on the Iranian nuclear programme. The White House 
was determined not to ‘interfere’ in Iranian domestic 
politics, both to avoid the regime being able to present 
the protests as rooted in foreign conspiracy and to 
keep open the possibility of engaging Ahmadinejad’s 
government. The actions of a junior staffer in the 
State Department, who contacted Twitter to ask 
the social network to postpone upgrade work that 
would have shut down the service in Iran, exposed 
the divisions within Obama’s foreign policy team 
that reflected the deeper issues in American policy. 
In part this was a deliberate decision to create a 
‘team of rivals’, giving voice to both foreign policy 
realists such as Robert Gates and Tom Donilon, as 
well as hawkish liberal internationalists including 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Susan Rice and Samantha 
Power. These divisions would be exposed later in the 
debate over whether to intervene in Libya, in which 
the latter two ‘interventionistas’ (Slaughter having 
left the administration complaining of a gender divide 
within the national security architecture) teamed up 
with Hilary Clinton to successfully make the case 
for intervention, a position that saw them dubbed 
‘Valkyries’ by The National Interest. 
Gender stereotyping aside, Obama’s foreign policy 
team reflected the President’s eagerness to hear diverse 
voices, a process vividly demonstrated throughout the 
protracted review of the Afghan strategy, in which 
Obama’s confidence in his ability to play the role of 
honest broker between competing factions almost 
amounted to a desire to be his own National Security 
Advisor. On no issue was the debate more fraught than 
over the Arab Spring, as competing ideologies and 
worldviews within the administration wrestled with 
longstanding conflicts between American interests 
in a region of vital strategic importance. It has been 
suggested that a President inexperienced in foreign 
policy was ‘pushed and pulled’ in all directions by 
this divided team, but on the evidence of the Afghan 
strategy deliberations it seems more likely that open 
debate is at the heart of Obama’s decision-making 
style, in which he seeks out all the options before 
attempting to find the middle ground. 
It has been regularly asserted that the events of the 
Arab Spring took the administration by surprise and 
found it uncertain and underprepared. Whilst the 
White House was reportedly irritated – rather unfairly 
– that the CIA had failed to provide early warning of 
the explosions in Tunisia and Egypt, the administration 
had been reconsidering the sustainability of the 
status quo in the Middle East since the protests 
following Iran’s Presidential election in 2009. 
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The President himself, in the aftermath of the failure 
the ‘Green Revolution’, took the time to think through 
the potential for unrest in the region, and in August 
2010 wrote a five page memorandum entitled ‘ 
Political Reform in the Middle East and North Africa’ 
which was circulated among senior members of his 
national security team. Documented by Ryan Lizza 
in the New Yorker in May 2011, the memo observed 
that socio-economic trends were feeding into citizen 
discontent, and that progress towards political 
openness had stalled at the same time as a number 
of countries, most notably Egypt, were facing the 
challenge of upcoming political successions. America’s 
autocratic allies, the President noted, were likely to ‘opt 
for repression rather than reform’ when faced with 
domestic dissent. Such developments might leave the 
United States ‘with fewer capable, credible partners’ 
as well as undermining America’s credibility ‘if we are 
seen or perceived to be backing repressive regimes 
and ignoring the rights and aspirations of citizens.’ 
Obama’s memo mandated a Presidential Study 
Directive, a country-by-country review of strategies 
for political reform. Led by Power, alongside Gayle 
Smith, Senior Director for global development in 
the National Security Council, and the roving Dennis 
Ross, the review attempted to rethink the costs and 
benefits of American support for its allies in the region 
from first principles. The resulting report, finished ‘the 
week that Tunisia exploded’ according to one official 
involved in the process, came down firmly on the 
side of the liberals within the administration; political 
reform was in the overarching interests of the United 
States, and was neither unsustainable in the region 
nor incompatible with America’s other priorities. Such 
conclusions tallied with the analysis of the ‘Egypt 
Working Group’, composed of neoconservatives, 
liberal hawks and human rights activists outside the 
administration, with which Ross had been overseeing 
the White Houses contacts.
Yet the long-term indefensibility of the status quo 
clashed with both America’s hegemonic interest in 
the stability of the world oil market and America’s 
unchallengeable commitment to Israel which generated 
immediate interests in the survival of the Saudi regime 
and the containment of Iran; notwithstanding the 
ongoing campaign against Al-Qaeda in the region. 
Obama was reluctant to throw the weight of the 
United States behind revolutions and in doing so 
threaten those core interests. Moreover, the White 
House was keenly aware of the hamfistedness of its 
predecessor’s Freedom Agenda, and worried that 
over-enthusiastic American support might actually 
undermine the revolutions’ authenticity. Obama’s 
rhetoric in public was therefore cautious, as he sought 
to balance competing interests in the context of events 
that exhibited great contingency and whose outcome 
was fundamentally uncertain.
Yet whilst seeking to avoid getting ‘ahead of the 
game’ in public, the administration used its long-
developed relationships in the region to attempt to 
shape developments. This was most clear in Egypt, 
where the United States’ decade of bankrolling 
the Egyptian military had enriched its generals and 
arguably made the Egyptian top brass more dependent 
on Washington’s patronage than on their relationship 
with Mubarak’s inner circle. Accounts of US diplomacy 
during the protests in Tahrir Square paint a picture of 
constant badgering of the Egyptian military through 
contacts at all levels – from Joe Biden in the White 
House to the Pentagon top brass right down to 
mid-ranking officers – as America’s mil-mil relations 
were leveraged for diplomatic purposes to insist that 
under no circumstances should Egyptian forces fire 
on protestors. Communication with Mubarak was less 
well coordinated, and the White House’s mixed signals 
almost certainly contributed to the Egyptian President’s 
increasingly bizarre attempts to hold on to power by 
offering the protestors vague commitments of reform. 
In Egypt then, America’s military relationship proved 
stronger than its political commitments, allowing the 
protestors to (initially at least) carry the day. 
The United States had no such relationship with 
Colonel Gaddafi’s forces, following more than a decade 
of international isolation before the Libyan leader’s 
post-9/11 rapprochement with Western weapons 
inspectors. Here the White House allowed pressure 
on the regime to be driven by the Europeans, and in 
the ill-judged words of one administration official, 
sought to ‘lead from behind’. The phrasing may have 
politically difficult for the President, but it captured 
both the administration’s concern that the United 
States should not be seen to be dictating movements 
57
for liberation, and the post-Bush awareness that 
American unilateralism often caused more difficulties 
than it solved.
If the administration’s publicly cautious but privately 
proactive management of the Egyptian crisis ultimately 
led it to the conclusion that Mubarak could be 
abandoned and Gaddafi overthrown, in other areas 
of the Arab Spring the United States had either less 
capacity to support change or less inclination to bring 
it about. In Yemen, where American counterterrorism 
assistance had been directed at reinforcing Ali Abdullah 
Saleh’s ability to exert control over a failing state, the 
dictator flatly refused direct American demands that 
he cede power. The Sunni monarchies in the Gulf were 
not questioned, even as Saudi Arabia led troops from 
the Gulf Cooperation Council to ‘maintain order’ in 
Bahrain, where the regime, responsible for some of 
the worst human rights violations of the Arab Spring, 
is the pliant host of America’s Fifth Fleet. 
In Syria, the Assad regime’s crackdown exposed the 
limited range of options in the United States foreign 
policy toolkit. With no leverage to bring to bear over a 
regime that the United States had sought to isolate as 
a result of its alliance with Iran, and the administration’s 
commitment to UN routes stymied by Russia, and to 
a lesser extent China, it was left to Kofi Annan to 
attempt to broker a distinctly unconvincing ceasefire. 
The administration is now urgently seeking new policy 
options on Syria, having hardened its stance to insist 
that Assad step down, and seems prepared to push 
for a Libyan-style escalation. Yet even with regional 
actors such as Turkey and the Gulf states committed 
to anti-Assad positions, their demands for ‘American 
leadership’ in providing resources, legitimacy and 
political cover threaten to involve the United States 
in precisely the kind of complex regional conflict that 
the administration had come to office seeking to 
extricate itself from.
PROSPECTS
The United States has had to tread a fine line between 
support for its values – and what it conceives as its 
long-term interests – represented by political reform in 
the region, and the protection of what it perceives as 
its core regional interests. Doing so has however had 
its own impact: whilst Israel expressed its concern at 
the United States’ willingness to jettison its Egyptian 
ally, the Saudi government reportedly threatened to 
prop up Mubarak rather than see him ‘humiliated’. 
Yet the irony is that the very channels of influence 
that allowed the United States to successfully prevent 
the Egyptian regime from using mass violence against 
pro-democracy demonstrators now align the United 
States with a ruling military elite more interested in 
protecting its position than in transitioning to genuine 
democracy. King Abdullah’s friend Mubarak has gone, 
and the budgets of democracy promotion programmes 
on the ground in Egypt have been boosted, but the 
United States remains wedded to a transition run by 
a military leadership that represents more continuity 
than change.  
In essence the United States remains limited in the 
impact it can have in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. 
The reality is that Washington no longer holds most 
of the cards in the region, if it ever did. Its capacity to 
cajole, co-opt and coerce varies immensely from place 
to place, as does its willingness to do so. 
Moreover, the reality remains that in a region that 
exhibits strong anti-American sentiment, coup-
proofing illegitimate regimes creates stronger ties 
between patron and client than the United States 
could hope to forge with regimes that command broad 
societal support. Yet the paradox is that propping 
up inherently weak regimes can never generate the 
lasting domestic stability – and with it, a degree of 
constancy in international behaviour that the United 
States craves in the region – in the way that social 
contracts based on consent can; indeed, it has been 
America’s support for failing regimes that is the source 
of much of the region’s anti-American opinion. 
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If the United States is serious about turning off 
its Middle detour and genuinely reorienting itself 
strategically to focus on the challenges of the Asia-
Pacific, then in the Middle East and North Africa the 
US needs to prioritise long-term trends over short-term 
concerns. This may not always mean pushing for 
revolutionary change in support of democratic values 
in the region. But it would mean making it clear that 
continued American support for those regimes that 
have ridden out the storm of the Arab Spring will be 
made dependent on their putting in place processes 
of political reform. 
Whether a long-term strategy for political reform in 
the region can survive either the short-term pressures 
presented primarily by Iran’s nuclear programme 
remains to be seen. Moreover, the challenge to 
America’s economic hegemony presented by the 
rise of China, the source of Obama’s desire to become 
‘the Pacific President’, cannot be disassociated from 
the United States’ support for the House of Saud, 
and its share of the world’s dollar-denominated oil 
supply. The United States’ cautious and contradictory 
approach to the Arab Spring thus reflects the fact that 
the Arab world does not exist in a vacuum, and there 
are wider issues at stake. ■  
